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CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AT THE EU LEVEL: 
SOME CRITICAL NOTES. 
Orsola Razzolini1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Frank I. Michelman raises four questions concerning the opportunity to include socio-
economic rights in a country’s constitutional law.2 The first is a question of ideal political 
morality and an aspiration of justice in modern pluralist conditions. The second explores 
whether a commitment to socio-economic rights in constitutional law is a condition of 
minimum moral legitimacy that otherwise allows a state regime to require compliance by 
citizens with its statutory laws and policies. The third question concerns the need for a 
constitutional basis for socio-economic rights or legitimation-by-constitution. Finally, the 
fourth is a question of “judicialization”, involving the competence of the country’s courts of 
law to scrutinize “the adequacy of the state’s performance in the field of social provisioning” 
and, in a broader sense, the legitimacy and adequacy of the state’s economic policy, which 
scrutiny is usually deemed impossible in the United States.3 
In Continental Europe, the Weimar Constitution of 1919 represents the first socio-
economic rights commitment in constitutional law. It reflects an attempt to reach a 
compromise between the individual liberalism of the 19th century and the 20th century 
aspiration of social justice and social solidarity that followed the rise of capitalism and 
collective movements and the shift away from a homogeneous (bourgeois) social structure 
toward a pluralist social structure.4  
The idea of a “social-democratic constitution” reflects an abandonment of the laissez-
faire approach for a new and different understanding of the relationship between state and 
economics, law, and politics. The state’s interventionism in the socio-economic sphere, on 
the one hand, and the recognition of the normative power of collective autonomies (such as 
trade unions), on the other, are regarded as “social techniques” used to level socio-economic 
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inequalities, to achieve Sozialisierung.5 Within this framework, the constitutional catalogue 
of fundamental rights is enlarged to encompass social positive rights that, unlike liberal 
negative rights, create positive obligations for state action in the socio-economic sphere.6 
Nevertheless, one of its main critiques concerned the excessive vagueness and 
uncertainty underpinning (a) the relationship between the state and its contractual partners – 
which permitted a degeneration into Nazism – and (b) the catalogue of fundamental rights.7 
Notably, fundamental social rights were understood more as “programmatic” principles or 
guidelines rather than directly-enforceable rights.8 They enabled courts of law to undertake 
constitutional interpretation and “social scrutiny” of economic policies and liberal rights; 
however, they were deprived of real effectiveness and justiciability, being rather dependent 
on legislative implementation. 
The Weimar experience influenced all continental European constitutions that contain 
distinctions between liberal negative rights and social positive rights and between self-
executing rights and rights whose enforceability depends on legislative implementation and 
state intervention.9 However, it is possible to find “bidirectional rights”10 – that is to say, 
rights which combine negative and positive aspects – by creating both negative and positive 
obligations for the State. The most relevant in Italy, for example, are the freedom of 
organization (Article 39.1 of the Italian Constitution) and the right to strike (Article 40 of the 
Italian Constitution). The State obligation is, first, an obligation of non-interference with 
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these fundamental freedoms that are inherent in both the individual and the intermediate 
groups constituting a pluralist society. At the same time, the weight placed on the need to 
level socio-economic inequalities so as to achieve social justice, substantive equality, and 
“equal freedom” requires defined positive obligations for the state 11(as well as for the 
employer) and the introduction of rules intended to protect and promote effectiveness of these 
rights at both the national and workplace levels.12 
The substantive indecisiveness and the compromise underlying the Weimar Constitution 
also characterizes the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter, the 
“CFR” or “Charter”). The Charter contains a long catalogue of fundamental socio-economic 
rights listed in Chapter 4, significantly named “Solidarity”. They include, for example: 
Worker’s right to information and consultation within the undertaking (Article 27); Right of 
collective bargaining and action (Article 28); Right of access to placement services (Article 
29); Protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (Article 30); Fair and just working 
conditions, without an express right to an equitable wage (Article 31); and Social security and 
social assistance (Article 34). Under Chapter 3, named “Equality”, we find the right to non-
discrimination (Article 21), Equality between men and women (Article 23), and Integration 
of persons with disabilities (Article 26). In the Charter’s Chapter 2, named “Freedoms”, we 
find the Freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work (Article 15). 
For several scholars, the Charter’s inclusion of the aforementioned socio-economic rights 
represents a ‘constitutionalization of employment rights’ at the EU level.13 But, what is here 
the meaning and the aim of the constitutionalization? 
Following Michelman’s lead, we might argue that the Charter’s constitutional catalogue 
of fundamental socio-economic rights reflects the Union’s aspiration of achieving social 
justice and harmonization between the economic and the social dimension. The socio-
economic rights commitment provides the Union with a minimum moral legitimation. In a 
communication on the CFR, the Commission underlines that the CFR is an “indispensable 
instrument of political and moral legitimacy”.14  
Notably, legitimation-by-constitution of socio-economic rights counterbalances the 
inclusion of fundamental economic freedoms in the Treaties, providing the Court of Justice 
                                                 
11
 See supra note 9. 
12
 See the Italian Statute of Workers of 1970, Law no. 300. 
13
 See, among others, recently, Franck Lecompte, Embedding Employment Rights in Europe, COLUMBIA J. OF 
EUROPEAN LAW 17 (2011) 1; Marc Bell, Constitutionalization and EU Employment Law, University of 
Leicester School of Law Research, Paper No. 13-05, 1. 
14
 Brussels, 13.9.2000, COM (2000) 559 final, at 3. 
4 
 
with the “constitutional legitimation” of its “social scrutiny” of institutional action and its 
judicial balancing of socio-economic rights and fundamental economic freedoms.15 The 
Court held, for instance, that the former are a legitimate limit on the latter16 or otherwise fell 
outside of the field of application of the applicable Treaty provision.17 More recently, the 
Court of Justice continued along the same path, regarding fundamental social rights that have 
a constitutional basis as a legitimate limitation of economic freedoms.18 However, as 
mentioned later, such limitations must be understood within the confines of the applicable 
Treaty provisions; they are, therefore, subject to intensive judicial scrutiny, in particular, the 
Court’s “legitimate aim” and “proportionality tests.19   
The constitutional character of social rights should allow the Court to affirm the “direct 
primacy and effectiveness and binding force”20 as well as “the higher or supralegal ranking in 
the regulatory hierarchy of the Community legal order”.21 Mark Bell links the meaning of 
“constitutionalization” to “processes that seek to entrench certain legal norms and to attribute 
them with a higher status”.22 This conclusion can be invoked with regard to Treaty provisions 
with a “constitutional character”, meaning primacy and direct effect.23 
Yet, the legal status of socio-economic rights listed in the CFR is far different. In the 
Communication of the Commission on the CFR, it was made abundantly clear that “the 
Charter will not be a vehicle to extend or reduce the powers of the Union and the 
Community, as established by the Union Treaty and EC Treaty. The Charter is neutral with 
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regard to the division of powers. Changes in any powers would be a matter for the 
Intergovernmental Conference, not for the Convention.”24 One goal of the Charter is to 
control and limit action by the EU Institutions while neither setting forth policy objectives 
nor committing those same institutions to take any particular social  action.  In this respect, 
when explaining why the right to work and the right to an equitable wage have not been 
included, the Commission said that “they were seen as simply setting policy objectives, 
which the Cologne conclusions25 prevent from being included in the Charter”.26 
Thus, the constitutional character of the socio-economic rights set out in the Charter 
must be tempered by the fact that the Charter is neutral and neither affects the competences or 
powers of the Union and the Member States and their respective institutions nor establishes 
social policy objectives for them. The listed socio-economic rights do not, therefore, limit the 
sphere of the Single Market.27 This is, of course, a completely different approach from the 
one used in the Weimar Constitution, which intentionally set out to define a new relationship 
between the State and economy, its law and policy. Due to the lack of clarity with respect to 
the EU’s commitment to socio-economic rights and further, its lack of competence with 
respect thereto, their so-called constitutionalization at the EU level seems far to be 
completed.  
The meaning of constitutional character is even more problematic in front of the 
ambiguous distinction between rights and principles28 and then goes on to explicitly provide 
that principles (but not rights) 
may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by [EU 
institutions and Member States implementing EU law, which acts] shall be 
judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on 
their legality.29 
Principles, unlike rights, only have only “normative justiciability” (justiciabilité normative),30 
which conclusion raises several doubts about the existing relationship between principles 
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included in the CFR and rights included in the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), which are, on the contrary, accorded direct horizontal effect. 
Leaving aside such ambiguities and uncertainties, the constitutionalization of socio-
economic rights (and principles) opens up the possibility of investigating the role that the 
solidarity principle and socio-economic rights can play in the interpretation of the acts of 
Members States and EU institutions. In the next sections, I will first distinguish between 
“individual” employment rights (such as the right to non-discrimination and the right to paid 
annual leave) and “collective” employment rights (such as the right to information and 
consultation and the right to collective bargaining and action). 
II. CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS: THE 
RIGHT TO NON-DISCRIMINATION AND THE RIGHT TO PAID ANNUAL LEAVE 
ECJ judgments concerning the right to non-discrimination and the right to paid annual 
leave are an excellent place to begin the analysis, starting from its first judgment in BECTU.31 
In giving his opinion to the Court, AG Tizzano observed that the right to paid annual leaves is 
a fundamental, automatic, and unconditional right granted to every worker to whom the 
Charter assures full and effective implementation.32 In Pfeiffer, the ECJ held that the need to 
effectively protect the health and safety of workers implied that any derogation from 
minimum requirements or maximum limits –  such as the 48 hour limit on the number of 
hours that can be worked in any 7-day period33  – requires the express and free consent of the 
individual worker. 34Consent given by that worker’s trade union representatives was not 
considered an equivalent. More precisely, it is necessary to ensure that 
if the worker concerned is encouraged to relinquish a social right which has 
been directly conferred on him by the directive, he must do so freely and with 
full knowledge of all the facts.35  
In KHS,36 the Grand Chamber of the CJEU confirmed that  
the right to paid annual leave is, as a principle of European Union social law, 
not only particularly important … but is also expressly laid down in Article 
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31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which 
Article 6(1) TEU recognizes as having the same legal value as the Treaties.37 
In Dominguez,38 the Court underscored that the right to paid annual leave is a 
fundamental right provided with direct effect, given that the wording of Article 7(1) of the 
Directive 2003/88/EC is unconditional and sufficiently precise, depending, however, on the 
public or private nature of the body or organization against which the individual is making 
his or her claim. 
Examples of constitutionalization of individual employment rights are  particularly 
prevalent in CJEU judgments addressing equality law. In the famous Mangold case,39 the 
Court drew a distinction between the effects of ordinary EU law and the effects of EU law 
that expresses fundamental rights. Generally, the principle of age equality in employment 
obligates national courts, who are called upon to guarantee the principle’s full effectiveness, 
to set  
aside any provision of national law which may conflict with Community law, 
even where the period prescribed for transposition of that directive has not yet 
expired.40 
In another leading case, Kücükdeveci,41 the Court of Justice went even further, holding 
that the need to ensure full effectiveness of the principle of non-discrimination on the ground 
of age (as expressed in Dir. 2000/78) requires national courts to decline to apply national 
provisions considered to be incompatible with that principle, thereby overcoming the limits 
of the vertical effect of Directives provided with direct horizontal effect. 
As has been observed, in terms of legal effect, the Kücükdeveci approach: 
seems to epitomise the idea of constitutionalization; certain legal instruments 
would be granted an elevated legal status based on their connection to the 
protection of fundamental rights.42 
The special combination of the Directive (Dir. 2000/78/EC) and the fundamental right to non-
discrimination on the ground of age (Article 21 CFR) allowed the Court to give the Directive 
direct horizontal effect. 
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What is missing in both Mangold and Kücükdeveci is the underlying legal reasoning that 
justifies giving direct horizontal effect to the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of 
age.43 By retracing the judgments, however, a possible reason seems to lie in the Court’s 
finding that such principle is a “general principle of Community Law”,44 which should permit 
its recognition as a subjective right afforded direct enforceability by Article 52.4 of the 
Charter. That provision specifically recognizes “fundamental rights as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States”. A second argument can be found in 
the Court’s finding that Directive 2000/78/EC gives specific content and expression to the 
principle.45 Yet another explanation relies on Article 6 of the Lisbon Treaty, which equates 
fundamental rights to Treaty provisions, giving both primacy and direct effect. Finally, 
another reason lies in an innovative, broad interpretation of the duty of fair cooperation of 
national courts, bound by the principle of effet utile. 
Neither Mangold nor Kücükdeveci provide a clear answer to the following question: In 
light of the Charter’s distinction between rights and principles in its Article 51 is the right to 
non-discrimination, set forth in its Article 21 a right or a principle? If Article 52.4 seems to 
indicate the possibility of aligning rights that result from the constitutional tradition common 
to Member States with subjective fundamental rights, in Kücükdeveci, the Court seems to 
equate the right to non-discrimination on the ground of age with a principle to which 
Directive 2000/78/EC has given substantive content and expression. The principle, as 
implemented by the Directive, can be invoked by private citizens, obligating national courts 
to assess the compatibility of national law with EU law and to set aside national legislation if 
it is found to undermine the effectiveness of that principle. A national judge must not only 
interpret national legislation so as to comply with EU law, but must also decline to apply 
such national legislation when it does not comply with a Directive that gives substantive 
content and expression to the fundamental principle of non-discrimination.  
Within this framework, the principle of non-discrimination is provided with both direct 
and indirect horizontal effect, regardless the public or private nature  of the body or 
organization against which the individual is making his claim. 46To some extent, this 
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approach recalls the French and Italian idea of indisponibilité de la qualification – that is, the 
idea that certain employment protections are given “constitutional” legal status and primacy 
over legislation, based on their connection to constitutional rights47 –or, with appropriate 
distinctions, the German Schutzpflicht (i.e., duty to protect) jurisprudence  that is sometimes 
linked to the horizontal Mittelbare Drittwirkung theory;48 national judges are bound to give 
full effect in private relations to fundamental principles governing the EU legal order. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the principle of non-discrimination is understood as a 
socio-economic principle, combining both social and economic objectives. 49The principle of 
non-discrimination serves both market integration (non-discrimination has always been the 
principal tool for achieving the Single Market) and social justice (e.g., the rationale behind 
the introduction of affirmative actions, the weight placed on the protection of human dignity, 
the codification of the duty of reasonable accommodation in case of disability, and 
mainstreaming policies).50  
Yet, in the aforementioned judgments, the principle of non-discrimination is understood 
only in its individual dimension. The collective dimension of the principle (which certainly 
exists when one considers mainstreaming policies, the role played by social dialogue, and the 
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creation of equality bodies51) is completely ignored. Maybe, as we shall see, the essentially 
individual character of the principle and the fundamental role it plays in the functioning of 
the Single Market and in market integration can explain the extensive protection the Court of 
Justice confers on it. Symmetrically, that also explains the narrow protection the Court 
confers on other social fundamental principles, such as the right to information and 
consultation and the right to collective bargaining and collective action. 
III. CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF COLLECTIVE EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS 
A. The Right to Information and Consultation  
In Association de médiation sociale (hereinafter AMS),52 the Court of Justice did not 
follow the approach it had taken in Mangold and Kücükdeveci; rather, it denied direct 
horizontal effect to the information and consultation rights set forth in Article 27 of the 
Charter, the content of which had been given specific expression by a Directive.53.  
As noted above, in Mangold and, more particularly, in Kücükdeveci, the Court held that a 
directive that transposed or was connected to a fundamental individual right (in those cases, 
the right to non-discrimination on the ground of age) could be used in private employment 
relationships and disputes. Thus, a national court could set aside national legislation if it 
found such legislation incompatible with EU law. In AMS, the question was whether the 
Mangold/Kücükdeveci holdings  could also be invoked  in connection with the transposition 
of Charter Article 27 by Article 1, Directive 2002/14/EC which provides the principle with 
“substantive and direct expression”.54  
The Court’s short answer was that Article 27 only defines a principle, (not a right) that 
does not have direct horizontal effect. It was, therefore, impossible to give Directive 
2002/14/EC direct horizontal effect, as it was only connected to a principle that had no such 
direct horizontal effect.55 On the contrary, the Court had previously held that the principle of 
non-discrimination on grounds of age was “sufficient in itself to confer on individuals an 
individual right which they may invoke as such”.56 
The Court’s underlying reasoning for the distinction made between these two 
fundamental principles is not very convincing. As indicated above,  the Kücükdeveci Court 
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seemed to think that non-discrimination on the ground of age was not a self-executing right, 
but was, rather, a principle given substantive content and expression by Directive 
2000/78/EC, which, in turn, gave both the Court of Justice and national courts the ability to 
scrutinize national legislation for consistency with EU law. It is difficult to consider the 
principle of non-discrimination, found in Article 21.1 in Chapter 3 “Equality” of the Charter,  
a self-executing right. On the contrary, insofar as it is based on the values of human dignity 
and substantial equality57, that right appears to be a social positive right, defining the specific 
commitment of the States and institutions to fight and remove all the obstacles that impede 
achievement of “full equality in practice”.58 In this respect, non-discrimination is a 
“bidirectional right” (like the bidirectional freedom to organize and right to strike), which 
combines both a negative freedom from State and institutional action and social positive 
duties on the State and institutions. 
Through its AMS judgment, the Court introduced a highly-disputable distinction between 
fundamental rights and principles, affecting the role each can play in interpreting the acts of 
EU Institutions59; the limited, vertical effect of directives can only be overcome if the 
directive is connected to a fundamental right that itself has horizontal direct effect. However, 
the Court’s reasoning presupposes, on the one hand, a clear distinction between such 
fundamental rights and principles. The distinction is not at all clear in the Charter, insofar as 
it is based either on (a) the idea that rights are recognized in the ECHR or in the common 
constitutional traditions of the Member States(principles, however, are not) or (b) on the 
continental European distinction made between fully enforceable rights and guiding or 
“programmatic” principles.60  On the other hand, the Court’s reasoning inevitably leads to a 
devaluation –  or a judicial “redrafting”61 –– of Charter Article 52.5. Principles do not appear 
to have no legal effects, but, rather, they can be used by courts as a means of interpretation or 
“as a standard to review the legality of other acts of the EU or of Member States”.62 
                                                 
57
 See, among others, Erica Howards, The European Year of Equal Opportunities of All-2007: Is the EU Moving 
Away from a Formal Idea of Equality?, ELJ 2008, vol. 14, p. 168-185; Marzia Barbera, Eguaglianza e 
differenza, supra note 50.  
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 See Article 7, Dir. 2000/78/EC. 
59
 See critically Silvana Sciarra, Association de médiation sociale. The disputed role of EU fundamental 
principles and the point of view of labour law, in SCRITTI IN ONORE DI GIUSEPPE TESAURO III, 2431 (Editoriale 
Scientifica 2014) 
60
 See supra § 1. See also Sacha Prechal & Steve Peers, Comment on Article 52, in THE EU CHARTER OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 1455 (Steve Peers et al eds., 2014). 
61
 See Pierre Rodière, L’information et la consultation des travailleurs dans la Charte des droits fondamentaux 
: un droit, un principe, finalement rien ?, SEMAINE SOCIALE LAMY, Feb. 2, 2014. 
62
 Prechal & Peers, supra note 60, at 1506. 
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The minimal reasoning given by the Court should be distinguished from that of AG Cruz 
Villalón, which was much more elaborate.63  First, AG Cruz Villalón acknowledged that 
information and consultation rights were, in fact, merely “principles” within the meaning of 
Article 52 of the Charter.64 Relying on the continental European tradition, he further 
recognized that the distinction was rooted in the legal tradition of several Member States that 
regard social rights as programmatic principles or guidelines addressed to public institutions 
for their effective implementation and “invokability”65. Social rights, though they work as 
guidelines for interpretation, are not self-executing; rather, they are but positive rights, which 
are clearly addressed only to governments.66 As we will see, this reasoning cannot be invoked 
for all social rights protected by the Charter’s Title IV-Solidarity-. For instance, according to 
several scholars, Article 28 (Right to collective bargaining and action) defines a fully 
justiciable right.67 
AG Cruz Villalón went on to investigate the meaning of Article 52.5; he  made a 
distinction between the “implementing acts of the principles”68 that give specific expression 
to a particular principle (focusing, in particular, on directives), on one hand and the potential 
to invoke such principles or the justiciability of such principles in private disputes, on the 
other. With regard to the former, AG Cruz Villalón identified such implementing acts as 
“provisions which can be said to give specific substantive and direct expression to the content 
of the ‘principle’”.69  In the AG’s opinion, Article 3(1) Dir. 2002/14/EC is a good example of 
just such an implementing act: it gives specific substantive and direct expression to the 
principle of workers’ information and consultation.  
That distinction led AG Cruz Villalón to investigate the latter, that is, the justiciability or 
invokability of such principles in private disputes. The core of his reasoning was that 
legislative acts – whether they be regulations or directives –  that do not simply implement 
                                                 
63
 AG Cruz Villalón Opinion, Association de médiation sociale, C-176/12, EU:C:2013:491. For a deep 
commentary of the opinion see See Sciarra, supra note 59; Bruno Caruso & Veronica Papa, I percorsi 
“accidentati” della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’UE… eppur la talpa scava, RIVISTA GIURIDICA DEL 
LAVORO, Jan. 15, 2014, at 185; Rodière, supra note 61. 
64
 AG Cruz Villalón Opinion, Association de médiation sociale, C-176/12, EU:C:2013:49. 
65
 AG Cruz Villalón Opinion, Association de médiation sociale, C-176/12, EU:C:2013:49, para. 66. 
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recognition of particular economic and social rights would result in the judicialisation of public policy, 
particularly in areas of significant budgetary importance. In fact, what would ultimately be called ‘principles’ 
were described in the initial drafts as ‘social principles’” (para. 49). 
67
 See, among others, S. Prechal & Peers, supra note 60, at 1508. 
68AG Cruz Villalón Opinion,  Association de médiation sociale, C-176/12, EU:C:2013:491, para. 62 ff. 
69
 AG Cruz Villalón Opinion,  Association de médiation sociale, C-176/12, EU:C:2013:491, para. 63. 
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principles, but “give substantive and direct expression to the content of principles”70 become 
incorporated in the substance of the principle. Thus, they, themselves become criteria for 
assessing the validity and legality of other acts adopted by EU institutions or Member States 
implementing such principles pursuant to Article 52.5 of the Charter. By referring to 
Mangold and Kücükdeveci, AG Cruz Villalón highlighted that a principle could be used in 
private disputes, as the main tool of interpretation of acts of institutions and Member States, 
once it had been given substantive content and expression in a directive or in another 
legislative act.71 Otherwise, simply by choosing to implement a principle via a directive, 
which has no direct horizontal effect, “the legislature would be able to deprive individuals, in 
disputes inter privatos, of the judicial review of validity which the Charter (Article 52.5) 
guarantees them”.72   
AG Cruz Villalón tried to take advantage of the opportunity to lay down a general legal 
theory explaining the innovative role the CFR (in particular, Title IV-Solidarity) could play in 
the interpretation and review of the legislative acts of the EU Institutions and Member 
States.73 His reasoning would appear to be fundamental in order to avoid the risk of depriving 
Charter Article 52.5 of any legal effect and, further, would appear consistent with the 
programmatic guidelines set forth in Mangold and Kücükdeveci. 
However, by distinguishing “implementing acts of the principles” that give substantive 
content and expression to the principle and become incorporated therein from other 
legislative implementing acts that can be reviewed and interpreted in light of such content 
and expression pursuant to Article 52.5 of the Charter74 , AG Cruz Villalón seems to have 
become trapped  in a vicious circle.75  Distinguishing between “acts giving specific 
substantive and direct expression to the content of a ‘principle’ and other acts, whether 
legislative acts or their individual implementing acts”76 appears to be a very difficult task. 
Nevertheless, AG Cruz Villalón’s  reasoning is of great value insofar as it tried to explain 
how fundamental socio-economic principles can become the legal standard of review for the 
legality of implementing acts of the institutions and Member States, as authorized by Charter 
Article 52.5. Unfortunately, AG Cruz Villalón’s interpretative effort was undervalued and 
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 Ibid. 
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 AG Cruz Villalón Opinion, Association de médiation sociale, C-176/12, EU:C:2013:491, para. 80. 
72
 Id. at 74. 
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14 
 
completely rejected by the Court of Justice, which resulted in depriving Charter Article 52.5 
of any legal effect. 
B. Right of Collective Bargaining and Action 
The caution of the Court towards collective rights was made clear in connection with 
another fundamental right: the right of collective bargaining and action, as set for the in 
Charter Article 28. As noted above, unlike information and consultation rights, this right 
might be described as bidirectional, in the sense that it creates both negative and positive 
obligations for the Member State.77   
The right to take collective action, including the right to strike, is defined by the Court of 
Justice as a “fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general principles of 
Community law the observance of which the Court ensures”.78 Thus, the right should be 
considered directly enforceable and justiciable according to Charter Article 52.4.79 If the right 
of collective bargaining and action were not regarded as a right, it would be deprived of any 
effect in the EU legal context due to the limited competence of EU institutions in this 
particular field pursuant to Articles 153(f) and 154(2)(b) and (5) TFEU.80  
Nonetheless, in spite of the institutions’ limited competence, the Court of Justice has 
frequently inferred from Article 6 TEU, which equates provisions of the Charter to other 
Treaty provisions, a legal basis for courts, including the CJEU, to balance fundamental social 
rights with economic freedoms. Interestingly, in Viking,81 the Court of Justice held that the 
right to strike is subject to the proportionality test, going beyond the EU limited competence 
in the social field and highlighting the problem of the democratic deficits of the European 
Union.82 
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sovereignty to the European Union without regard to divisive social concerns and majority-minority relations. 
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The Court’s reasoning was quite simple. Charter Article 28 acknowledges that workers 
have the right to take action, including strike action, to defend their interests “in accordance 
with Union law”. The crucial question for the Court, then, was the meaning of that limitation? 
Did it that mean that restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental right must be provided 
for only by Union or national law and practices? Or did it mean that the exercise of the right 
to strike and collective bargaining must be reconciled with all the other EU provisions? 
In Viking, the Court adopted the latter proposition; it further expanded that general limit 
by stating that the exercise of the right to strike 
does not fall outside the scope of the provisions of the Treaty and must be 
reconciled with the requirements relating to rights (such as [the] right to 
establishment) protected under the Treaty and in accordance with the principle 
of proportionality.83 
Collective action, then, became subject to double judicial scrutiny: first, it applied the 
legitimate aim test and then applied the proportionality test. By doing so, it  established a 
rule/exception relationship between economic freedoms and collective rights. In that regard, 
the judicial balancing required by the Viking judgment leads to a “transfer of sovereignty to 
judiciary that takes over the functions of the government”.84  
If, however, we adopt the first interpretation of the wording “in accordance with Union 
law” – that is, any restrictions on the exercise of this fundamental right must be provided for 
only by Union law or national law and practices – the outcome of the judicial balancing 
might change. This interpretation seems to be much more consistent also with Article 52 of 
the CFR.  
In a nutshell, Charter Article 52.1 provides  
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights 
and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be 
made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general 
interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms 
of others. (Emphasis added) 
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Further, Charter Article 52.3  also that the essence of rights corresponding to rights 
guaranteed also by the European Convention of Human rights shall be at least the same, 
whilst “more extensive protection” is always possible. ECHR Article 11.2, for example, 
provides that the right to form and join a Trade Union cannot be subject to any restrictions  
other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.85 
According to the European Court of Human Rights, these restrictions have to be interpreted 
strictly.86 
Finally, Charter Article 52.4 provides that fundamental rights that result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States must be “interpreted in harmony with 
those traditions”. 
In light of that provision, it is very difficult to accept that the fundamental right of 
collective bargaining and action could be implicitly restricted by Treaty provisions that define 
the realm of economic freedoms. On the contrary, according to Charter Article 52, 
restrictions must be expressly imposed by Union or national law and must comply with the 
legitimate aim test and with proportionality test, without going below the standard of 
protection laid down in the ECHR.   
In the meantime, Article 52 prevents looking at fundamental rights as mere restrictions 
on other fundamental freedoms.87 By inferring the limits of collective rights and the 
rule/exception relationship between economic freedoms and collective rights from the scope 
of Treaty provisions, the Court of Justice imposed precise goals and functions on collective 
action, thereby impairing the very essence of the right. A clear example thereof is provided in 
Laval.88   
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Unlike in Viking, in the Laval case, the interference with the fundamental right to take 
collective action with the economic freedom to provide services was considered in a context 
of partial harmonization: the posting of workers regulated by Dir. 96/71/EC. It is not possible 
in this short work to analyze the complex Laval judgment in detail; suffice it to note that is 
has been criticized by a number of scholars.89 However,  the core of the decision lies in the 
Court’s finding that Article 3 of the Directive sets down a harmonized maximum standard of 
employment protection that the host Member State can impose on foreign service providers 
posting workers. As a result, collective action intended to improve working conditions 
beyond the maximum level set down in Article 3 – notably, collective action intended to 
force a foreign services provider to enter into a collective agreement, which has not erga 
omnes effects, providing for a minimum hourly wage90 - cannot be considered to be a 
“justified restriction” of the freedom to provide services. 
Although it found that fighting social dumping and protecting workers’ interests are  
an overriding reason of public interest … which, in principle, justifies a 
restriction of one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty”,91 
it went on to find, in the context of posting of workers  that the partial harmonization 
achieved by Directive 96/71/EC  had already identified the maximum standard of 
employment protection that the host Member state can impose on foreign service providers. 
Thus, it held that an employer established in one Member State could only be required to 
observe, in another Member State, that level of protection set down in Article 3 of that 
directive. As in Sweden the wage levels is not set forth in law or collective agreements with 
erga omnes effects – as required by Article 3 –  the Court held that they fell outside the field 
of application of Article 3 and, therefore, could not be imposed on foreign service providers. 
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Interestingly, the principle of favor, which is recognized in Article 3(7)92 and which 
should guarantee that partial harmonization does not prevent regulatory competition above 
the minimum floor of rights set forth in the Directive, is denied any role.93 As Simon Deakin 
observed, “Laval gives the Posting of Workers Directive a ‘pre-emptive’ effect, reading it, 
contrary to its own clearly expressed intent, as if it were a ceiling not a floor”.94 As a 
consequence of Laval, collective autonomy is deprived of both one of its main goals, which is 
to improve existing living and working conditions95, and the ability to contribute to the 
construction of the social dimension of the EU market. To put it in another way, the right of 
collective bargaining and action is deprived of its very substance, contrary to Charter Article 
52.1. 
One explanation for the controversial approach taken by the Court lies in contradictory 
EU views of “social dumping”. Although the Court of Justice did not deny that “fighting 
social dumping” is an overriding reason of public interest,96 its main focus was on the 
creation of a Single Market and, consequently, on the effectiveness of the economic freedoms 
provided by the Treaties, regardless the manner in which those freedoms are exercised, 
including social dumping.97 In other words, social dumping has become, in reality, the most 
basic and most frequently used legitimate tool to achieve the Single Market, which deeply, 
and inevitably, undermines the substance and nature of collective rights. 
There are few judgments in which the Court (or the Advocate General, for that matter) 
appears to be sensitive to the substance of collective rights. For instance, in Prigge,98 AG 
Cruz Villalón drew a distinction between national law which must originate from public 
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authorities, and autonomy in collective bargaining, which enjoys a “special respect in 
national legal traditions”.99  
By taking into consideration the list of legitimate reasons, set down in Article 6(1) Dir. 
2000/78/EC,  that can justify a derogation from the prohibition of age discrimination, AG 
Cruz Villalón concluded that the protection or preservation of collective autonomy can 
assume the nature of a legitimate social policy objective within the meaning of the Directive 
capable on occasion of reducing the scope of the general principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of age.100 
That is to say, he found it was not necessary to investigate the reasons behind a collective 
agreement that derogated from the prohibition of age discrimination (i.e., the automatic 
termination of pilots at the age of 60 at issue in the case). Rather, he found the need to 
preserve the autonomy of collective bargaining, in and of itself, to be a legitimate interest of 
social policy that could justify such a derogation. However, the Court of Justice did not 
follow this line of thought. 
AG Cruz Villalón’s approach might be aligned, to some extent, to the one taken by the 
Court in Schmidberger,101 which dealt with the freedom of assembly and association in 
relation to the Austrian Government’s failure to ban an environmental demonstration on the 
Brenner motorway, which obstructed free movement of goods for almost 30 hours. The Court 
noted that the freedom of assembly and association “form[s] an integral part of the general 
principles of law the observance of which the Court ensures”.102 It went on to hold that 
fundamental rights, though not absolute, may constitute a legitimate restriction of 
fundamental freedoms. Whether the ultimate restriction on such freedoms is, in fact, 
proportionate in relation to the legitimate aim pursued was left to national authorities, to be 
determined according to the criteria laid down by the Court of Justice. Essentially, the Court 
held that national authorities must weigh the values at stake and all of the circumstances to 
determine whether the legitimate aim could have been achieved with less restrictive 
measures. In Schmidberger, the decisive point was that the fundamental rights of freedom of 
assembly and expression, in and of themselves, were considered the legitimate aim of the 
government’s action, while the actual purpose of the demonstration (i.e., protection of 
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environment and public health) played no formal role in determining legitimacy.103 AG 
Jacobs underscored that 
 although protection of health and the environment in the Alpine region is 
clearly a major concern, the issue to be decided here is not a direct conflict 
between that concern and the free movement of goods. In my view, the aim of 
the demonstration is of no significance when assessing the possible liability of 
the Member State.104 
This approach appears to be much more sensitive and respectful towards the very substance 
and nature of collective rights. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
My main aim here was a critical appraisal of the “constitutionalization” of socio-
economic rights at the EU level. Specifically, I have pointed out the different approaches 
taken by the Court of Justice toward individual socio-economic rights, on the one hand, and 
collective socio-economic rights, on the other.  
In its judgments concerning non-discrimination and equal treatment, the Court of Justice 
strongly supported non-discrimination rights and their direct horizontal effect, which effect it 
found could be extended to Directives that transpose the content of such rights. A plausible 
explanation for the Court’s approach might be that non-discrimination rights are 
predominantly understood as individual rights that can be more easily reconciled with the 
main character of EU law and EU community, based on the empowerment of the individual 
and of the EU citizen,105 rather than of the people of Europe and of intermediate groups. The 
collective aspect of non-discrimination rights, though certainly existent, has not yet been 
explored or taken into account by the Court. Moreover, as mentioned above, non-
discrimination is and has always been the most basic and essential tool used to achieve the 
Single Market. 
To date, the Court’s attitude towards collective socio-economic rights – such as 
information and consultation rights and the right of collective bargaining and action – has 
been rather different. More precisely, the Court has focused on the controversial distinction 
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between “rights” and “principles” and has used it to deny any direct horizontal effect of 
collective rights. It has even gone so far as to demote the role collective rights and 
“solidarity” play when evaluating the compatibility of that acts of institutions and Member 
States with EU law. Furthermore, the weight the Court has given to the Single Market, 
whatever the reasons underlying the exercise of economic freedoms (e.g., social or fiscal 
dumping), has undermined the very substance of collective rights, the purpose of which is to 
fight social dumping and to improve working conditions. 
In the face of such Court decisions, what, if any, is the future of labor law and of socio-
economic rights? I have not tried to address that very broad and complex question here. 
Nevertheless, I suggest that a different scenario be considered, one that endorses a different 
interpretation of the Charter, particularly its Articles 28 and 52. A different interpretation 
could very well lead to a much more critical assessment of the Court’s use of judicial 
balancing when reviewing the application of the legitimate aim and proportionality tests to 
collective labor rights. In turn, it might be the key to opening a more critical appraisal of both 
the rule/exception relationship between economic freedoms and collective socio-economic 
rights and between the economic and social dimension of the European Union. 
